[.ca] A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy ... (ISBN 0156013096)

From Amazon.com:
There was a moment when the United States had the Vietnam War wrapped up, writes military historian Lewis Sorley (biographer of two Vietnam-era U.S. Army generals, Creighton Abrams and Harold Johnson). "The fighting wasn't over, but the war was won," he says in this convention-shaking book. "This achievement can probably best be dated in late 1970." South Vietnam was ready to carry on the battle without American ground troops and only logistical and financial support. Sorley says that replacing General Westmoreland with Abrams in 1968 was the key. "The tactics changed within fifteen minutes of Abrams's taking command," remarked one officer. Abrams switched the war aims from destruction to control; he was less interested in counting enemy body bags than in securing South Vietnam's villages. A Better War is unique among histories of the Vietnam War in that it focuses on the second half of the conflict, roughly from Abrams's arrival to the fall of Saigon in 1975. Other volumes, such as Stanley Karnow's Vietnam and Neil Sheehan's A Bright Shining Lie, tend to give short shrift to this period. Sorley shows how the often-overlooked Abrams strategy nearly succeeded--indeed, Sorley says it did succeed, at least until political leadership in the United States let victory slip away. Sorley cites other problems, too, such as low morale among troops in the field, plus the harmful effects of drug abuse, racial disharmony, and poor discipline. In the end, the mighty willpower of Abrams and diplomatic allies Ellsworth Bunker and William Colby was not enough. But, with its strong case that they came pretty close to winning, A Better War is sure to spark controversy. --John J. Miller

The best yet in Vietnam War Revisionism:
This book is by far the best in a new wave of scholarly works that contend the American War effort in Vietnam was legitimate and/or winnable. Sorely convincingly argues that the Free World Forces had essentially won sometime in 1970-1971 by successfully denying the Communists access to the Republic of Vietnam's population and through successful nation building. By this time, South Vietnam was a viable nation that could survive indefinitely as long as it continued to recieve US financial support and access to American air power. Mr. Sorley backs his thesis up with good statistics. He seems to understand that many will question any US government data from Vietnam and backs each contention with anecdotal evidence. Some examples of this include CIA chief Colby wandering alone at night alone in a rural area where years earlier he would surely have been murdered and South Vietnamese militia (the folks common wisdom says either ran away or defected on sight of Communist forces) going toe to toe and besting the cream of the North Vietnamese Army. Most criticisms of this book claim its just another in a line of "we were stabbed in the back by liberals and the media" tomes. Its more than that but there is a very minor undercurrent of this. If Mr. Sorely contends we had victory in the bag, then an exploration of why we ultimately lost is essential. Sorely seems to believe the opportunity for success was destroyed by liberal elites (here represented by Senator Kennedy and Jane Fonda) campaigning for a Communist victory even after American ground forces were being removed from the theater and by powers in the media largely refusing to broadcast the later successes in Vietnam (represented mainly by anectdotal evidence that Walter Cronkite spiked all reports showing the war effort in a good light during this time period). Such activity further sapped war weary Americans and the anti-communist leadership. This in turn allowed the pro-Comunist elements in our society to cut off the essential aid discussed above. All in all this is a very small portion of the book (10-15 pages at most). I docked the book one star because of Sorely's irrational hero worship of General Abrams who seems to be the prime mover in the reforms that brought such success. I agree Abrams was a much better commander than Westmoreland and he was largely responsible for the improvements Sorely describes. Unfortunately, Sorely pushes it too far at times. Heres a prime example. Abrams' main strategy was to secure population centers and use American forces in direct combat only if the benefits would be high and the price low. By doing this, he denied the Communists recruits and logistical support while not exaserbating American war weariness. This flies in the face of the "Hamburger Hill" Battle where elements of the 101st Airborne were sent head on up a fortified hill. Sorely says this was justified because it was necessary to open up an access route into Saigon. Im not convinced. By this time, ARVN had adequate resources to do the job. Also, the battle caused Congressional constraints that essentially ended his ability to use Ameircan ground forces in direct action again. Doesnt seem worth the price to me. However, this book is a keeper and essential to any serious study of the Vietnam War.

Relevance to Today's War on Terrorism:
I started reading this book prior to 11 September 2001 and just finished it. If for no other reason, this book should be read and examined in light of the recent mobilization of Reserves and deployment of service members to participate in the campaign against terrorism. It is clear to me that members of the Armed Services will be called upon to fight enemies that include both state and non-state actors that have the capability to cause immense harm to U.S. interests within this country and abroad. I have suffered through numerous editorials that proclaim the best U.S. strategy, most by people who couldn't lead a cow to pasture. Few seem to realize what it takes to mount a serious campaign and the level of intelligence and foresight that is required from all facets of government to properly execute actions across the spectrum of government power. This book highlights the constraints faced during the Vietnam War and the remarkable job that was done without the help of anyone on U.S. soil. A clear case is made within the book that several elements of our national power were never adequately employed. In fact, the diplomatic, informational, military and economic facets of our national power actually fought AGAINST each other. Prior to 11 September 2001, the American government had been waging an ineffective fight against terrorism. Much like Vietnam, it was not a fight that the American public backed to any significant degree. Unlike Vietnam, it was not one that people protested against, the Congress fought against or the media attempted to subvert to prove their "credibility". Within hours after the attack on the U.S., this changed. So how is this book relevant to today? The problems that we faced in conducting the war in Vietnam will be faced again as we prosecute this campaign. There is no pure diplomatic, informational, military or economic solution to the problem. All must share in the planning and the execution to understand the affects of each action. Today's military leadership has learned some hard lesons through the past 50 years. Sorley states, "every military leader is taught early on to make what is called an 'estimate of the situation,' the heart of which is consideration of what enemy course of action might be provoked by various friendly courses of action, with similar calculations performed for a range of alternative courses of action. Such calculations are the essence of modern wargaming as well, and often have significant impact on how the commander uses the force at his disposal." The difference today is that the military leadership understands that each application of military power will impact on the other elements of power and all must be combined to find the best course of action and to be prepared for the enemy response. In addition, at least temporarily, the American public, Congress and media are solidly behind the President as he begins the campaign. Can it be maintained?

Great information, could be better written:
This is a very serious book. It's packed with detail and analysis from previously unrevealed sources and first-hand interviews. That's both a good and bad thing. Good because Sorley makes his case very well, bad because sometimes the detail gets a bit monotonous and tedious. But, overall, this is a fine book that is sure to challenge some commonly held beliefs about the Vietnam War. As the subtitle makes clear, Sorley deals exclusively with the latter half of the war, namely from General Creighton Abrams' promotion to commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam in 1968 to the final U.S. pullout in 1975. Sorley concludes that this period of the war was vastly different from the first half - different tactics, different strategy, different and better results. It was, in essence, a better war. Abrams' successor was General Westmoreland, and he preferred large divisions that searched for the enemy in the jungles. This caused high casualties, confusion among the ranks, logistical difficulties, and lowered morale, especially among the enlisted men. Abrams arrived with a different strategy. Rather than search-and-destroy with large divisions, he preferred secure-and-hold with smaller units. He believed that the war would be won at the village level. The villages must remain safe from North Vietnam Army (NVA) attacks and Viet Cong infiltrations. Once that happened, the larger cities like Saigon could go on the offensive and secure themselves from enemy shelling. With the cities and villages secure, the South Vietnamese could organize their own forces, units that included village, city, and regional troops. Once that was done, the U.S. Army could slowly leave the ground fighting to the South Vietnamese while supplying air cover, supplies, and advice. According to Sorley, by 1972 this strategy had succeeded, so well that the war could have been considered won. The villages were safe and secure, the VC was no longer a factor, and the NVA was nowhere in South Vietnam. Massive U.S. air strikes had slowed the flow of NVA troops and war equipment to the South along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. So if all this is true, then what happened? Why did the communists win the war? Several reasons, according to Sorley: Lack of support from the politicians at home. Congress and the Nixon Administration were more concerned with pulling out and less concerned with victory. By 1972, Abrams had fewer than 50,000 troops at his disposal, which makes his achievements even more impressive. Unflagging support for the North from China and the Soviet Union. When the Paris agreement was ratified, and the North immediately violated it by flooding the South with troops and tanks, the U.S. failed in its promise to punish the North with air support. The Communists proved better allies than the U.S., because they kept the North well-stocked, while the South steadily ran out of supplies. North Vietnamese officials kept in constant contact with the anti-war movement in America, using it to spread communist propaganda and lies. This undermined public support for the war, which at one time was high. This is the essence of Sorley's book. It's a powerful case. What I found sad was America's total abandonment of South Vietnam. We had fought for years to keep the country from communist domination and then threw it all away when victory was so close. It was not our finest hour.

Different perspective, with faults:
This book is worth reading if the reader wants a full perspective on the Vietnam war. In a lot of ways, the book is a wasted opportunity. Having additional sources of information (the Abrams tapes) available to him, the author feels compelled to quote from those sources at length. Wishing to point out who was responsible for a beneficial change in policy in the war, Sorley worships General Abrams and demonizes General Westmoreland. Wanting to illustrate the unimportance of bombing North Vietnam, he mixes up statistics of Cessna mail flights with those of B-52 raids over Hanoi. To persuade us that most South Vietnamese civilians were in safe hamlets and that the South Vietnam government was protecting its people, he forgets to tell us that the "safe hamlets" were not the villagers' own home hamlets. His main point is that moving away from Westmoreland's "search and destroy" tactic to Abram's "clear and hold" tactic brought us to the brink of winning the Vietnam War. Yet let's not forget that the commanders' actions were often both dictated and limited by American politics: Westmoreland had Johnson, and Abrams had Nixon. To what extent was South Vietnam a viable country? They were much more our "client" than our "ally," by any measure. Would pointless activities such as the Thieu/Ky rivalry, and Thieu's continuing support of ineffective generals, have ever resulted in a stable situation, such as we have now in North/South Korea? Would the North Vietnamese have ever given up? Would it be politically and physically possible to continually invade Laos, Cambodia, and the DMZ to deny the North Vietnamese their staging and supply areas? Would we risk scuttling our valuable relationships with Russia and China to coerce Russia and China into abandoning North Vietnam? If you read this book, keep in mind that it has its limitations, biases, and inaccuracies. Be sure to read other books, such as _Our Vietnam/Nuoc Viet Ta: A History of the War 1954-1975_ by A. J. Langguth.

Better War a solid academic work and an entertaining read:
For readers or researchers seeking a thoughtful and thoroughly researched book on a critical period in U.S. history, Sorley's book should be high on the list. Sorley has given historians and students of the Vietnam War a unique gift in this examination of the later years of America's longest war. For those that think they already know all there is to Vietnam, "A Better War" is a must-read. This is a new perspective from a reliable source and footnoted in manner that puts other works such as Stanley Karnow's "Vietnam" to shame.