[.ca] Our Posthuman Future: Consequences Of The Biotechnology ... (ISBN 0312421710)

From Amazon.co.uk:
In Our Posthuman Future, one of America's most conspicuous public intellectuals, Francis Fukuyama, explores the profound political, social and spiritual implications of the biotechnology revolution. He argues that if we are to avoid some of the worst political consequences of the biotech revolution then sweeping national and international regulation is required. The heart of the book lies in his discussion of the philosophical issues raised by our ability to manipulate human nature. Fukuyama argues that future biotech capabilities may give us the capacity to effectively control human behaviour but may ultimately lead us into a "posthuman" future. What is ultimately at stake in the biotech revolution, according to Fukuyama, is the loss of our human essence. This amounts to more than a mere change in genetic constitution because the politically indispensable concept of human rights is derived not from God nor from man himself, but from nature. Fukuyama has some plausible predictions about the way the American political landscape will shift as a result of the biotech revolution. The left, he predicts, will be split between pro-personal autonomy and environmentalist/anti-eugenicist wings, while the right will be split on libertarian versus social-conservative camps. He is also right on target with his critique of the aggressive atheism of scientific materialist philosophers who suppose that religiously motivated objections to biotechnology will wither away in the wake of the forces of modernity. However, overall, it is difficult to share Fukuyama's sense of the importance of "natural rights" to the discussion of biotechnology. Even if one accepts the idea that it is possible and worthwhile to identify the "species-typical behaviour" of humans, why should we accept that the abandonment of the idea of a "single human nature shared by all peoples of the world"--what Fukuyama calls "Factor X"--fatally undermines our commitment to the idea of universal human equality? Similarly, why should we accept the idea that to manipulate human genes is to manipulate human values? Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the central argument Our Posthuman Future is a stimulating and provocative read, virtually guaranteed to annoy large numbers of philosophers and scientists. --Larry Brown

A Commendable Failure:
This is a book with many virtues and one fatal flaw. Among the former are a clear, lucid style and an impressive overview of the state of the art in contemporary genetic science and the moral debates that they have provoked. This book is highly recommended to those who are relatively new to these issues and want a superb, layman's introduction. But the book's central argument is embarrassingly weak. Fukuyama relies on Aristotle to support his central claim that morality ought to be grounded in an essential conception of human nature, the substance of which he sketches in the core chapters of the book. Scientific techniques should be regulated by the state, he argues, so that they do not threaten this nature, and thereby constitute an assault on human dignity. The flaw here is what 20th Century philosophers have labelled "the naturalistic fallacy": deriving a statement of value from a statement(s) of fact(s). In a word, facts tell us nothing about what is valuable. Fukuyama confronts this objection head-on by denying that the naturalistic fallacy really is a fallacy. (The "naturalistic fallacy fallacy"!) I admire his intellectual gusto in doing so, although he had little choice if he wanted his argument to have some chance of success. But he just isn't a good enough philosopher to pull it off. He doesn't even come remotely close. The fact that many philosophers (eg. Kant, Rawls) who accept that this is a fallacy have made claims about human nature--this is Fukuyama's main counter-argument--may be true, but it simply goes to show that they were inconsistent; it doesn't touch the naturalistic fallacy. That is the (weak) heart of his counter-argument. This isn't a minor problem for Fukuyama. His whole argument pivots on it. One can almost hear the rest of his book come crashing down around mid-way, as he earnestly rides into battle against the naturalistic fallacy armed with the flimsiest of weapons and fails to make even a small dent in it. All of the prescriptive aspects of the book fall with this failure, which makes the book overall a failure. (A disturbing conclusion, when one considers that Fukuyama is on a national committee on bioethics advising the US government!) But the copious descriptive parts of the book are very well executed and impressively well-informed, making it a commendable failure. You will learn a lot about modern science from this book, and nothing about what (ethically) to do about it.

Thoughtful and interesting:
There is no great revolutionary thesis here of the kind that Fukuyama astonished the world with in his previous work, claiming that the end of history had come and it is the triumph of liberal democracy. But there is the same kind of reasoned and measured thought, this time about the very nature of what it means to be human, and the threats to our humanity posed by our own technological innovations. It seems to me that Fukuyama touches on only a share of the problems involved with the question. And I believe he could be helped had he relied on the Jewish conception , that human beings are creators creating in the image of the Creator and therefore constantly recreating themselves. i.e. by the conception that the essence of Mankind is in transcending our past humanity to create our next stage of development. In any case this is an important book for anyone who would understand the problems Humanity is facing today in regard to its own essence and future.

Thinly disguised neophobia, but worthwhile:
By almost any standard, social philosopher Francis Fukuyama's "Our Posthuman Future" is an important book. In it, he explores near-term breakthroughs in neuropharmacology (i.e., Prozac, Ritalin, Zoloft), genetic screening and the looming prospect of germ-line genetic engineering, which could conceivably fracture the human race beyond recognition a la Aldous Huxley's cautionary masterpiece "Brave New World." Fukuyama is an engaging polemicist who knows biotechnology and harbors understandable reservations about its potential. So perhaps it's surprising that I don't agree with his thesis. Much of "Our Posthuman Future" is devoted to Fukuyama's case for "human nature" and "human dignity." One can hardly blame him; the technologies he describes pose grave existential questions for the human condition. We may very well evolve into a "posthuman" stage of being. My central problem is Fukuyama's negative reading of the term "posthuman"; though he applauds biotech breakthroughs that have prolonged and improved human life, he equates "posthuman" with the soulless "happy slaves" of dystopian science fiction. He seems unable or unwilling to foster the notion that willfully upgrading the human species through psychotropic drugs or genetic intervention might result in a legitimate long-term improvement. Fukuyama accomplishes his literary mission by vigorously defending what he terms "human nature." To his credit, he gives us a robust historical model of what it means to be human, citing philosophers from Aristotle to Nietzsche and even name-dropping roboticist Hans Moravec and artificial intelligence advocate Ray Kurzweil. But he refuses to acknowledge that the definition of "human" is conceivably in our hands and not the exclusive domain of blind natural selection, thus ignoring the opportunity to develop an authentically new transhumanist philosophy. Any reader will naturally sympathize with the impending bioethical controversies scrutinized in "Our Posthuman Future." For example, will germ-line engineering lead to a race of superhumans and, if so, what happens to the founding principles of liberal democracy? Will parents of the near-future screen prospective embryos for desired characteristics, resulting in a genetic aristrocracy? Unfortunately, Fukuyama's arguments are rendered toothless by his unwillingness to challenge the prevailing biomedical paradigm, which seeks to treat the sick yet leave well enough alone. For Fukuyama, death is not merely acceptable in a society of potential immortals, but confirmation of "human nature." Predictably enough, he ends his book with a rallying cry for increased governmental precautions and legislation against technologies that might revise his quaint definition of "human." To be sure, "Our Posthuman Future" is worth reading. Fukuyama is intelligent and sincerely cares about the future of humanity and civil liberty, which is more than can be said for many of his contemporaries. But even his best arguments are burdened with thinly disguised neophobia.

Human Nature Has Never Been Static:
What is "human nature"? And will failure to initiate widespread government oversight of scientific research that could change this definition open a Pandora's Box of dire consequences? Fukuyama suggests that failure to impose substantial government dictates over the "when's" and "how's" of future research centering on the human body and mind will precipitate a significant sea change in the inherent nature of our species, how we interact with one another, and a potential threat to Liberal Democracy. The implicit message is that unfettered scientific inquiry will lead to developments we will come to deeply regret. While Fukuyama correctly illustrates the "easy fixes" that our society has latched onto (Prozac, Ritilin: Who said freedom to choose would mean wise choices?), his thesis fails to acknowledge the considerable roadblocks that Religion and State have placed in the way of the evolution of our species throughout history. "Human nature" has, in fact, demonstrated a rather elastic nature over time. If one accepts the premise that human nature is fixed in an eternal quest for freedom, self-development and dignity and is manifested in superior intelligence, then one would want to remove any artificial roadblocks to creating the maximum environment in which these attributes could flourish. How else to explain the demise of almost all competing political models to Liberal Democracy? Yet, Fukuyama proposes a step backward, based on what appears to be a fixed, non-elastic definition of human nature. Were a caveman to be plopped down in the late 20th Century and witness the first heart transplant, would he recoil in disgust and declare the practice inimical to the basic fabric of human existence? Quite likely. Does that mean, with the limited intelligence of a less developed brain - but with a brain nonetheless and all basic body parts and feelings that "Modern Man" exhibits - that the caveman would be right? I don't believe anyone would answer in the affirmative. Now, as Man fights to tap the wonders of stem cells to better his fellow man by ridding the world of Parkinson's, Alzheimer's, spinal cord injuries and the like, a new Holy Alliance of Religion and State has swooped in to cut off this laudable research at its knees. Already, the director of the National Institutes of Health has called on President Bush to lift draconian restrictions on research utilizing the stem cells of embryos discarded from fertility clinics (clinics whose practices have been condemned by only a vocal minority). Other voices, including a broad-based medical ethics panel, also call for revision of the Administration's protocols. Time was, Inquisitions were used to ferret out individuals whose scientific curiosity did not adhere to those of The True Believers. Now we have a more diplomatic way to arrive at the same end: find a politician to serve as Front Man. As dispassionate and thoughtful as Fukuyama's work appears on the surface - and no one can really argue that the author is a card-carrying member of The Religious Right or a shill for the Papacy - Fukuyama's call to action would have us expand the yoke of State control (in concert with the views of select religious figures) at a time when his beloved model of Liberal Democracy is finally expanding across the globe, toppling barriers to the practical application of human intelligence everywhere. Which, in its own way, is rather ironic.

...and this guy's on the president's bioethics panel?!:
I guess someone has to play the job of the paranoid futurist and Fukuyama has done a great job of it in the past. Here, he is no better. His aim: the biotech industry. His worry: biotech threatens human dignity. His arguments: (?) I bought this book after seeing him on a C-SPAN panel discussion and he seemed quite balanced. Myself seeing nothing wrong with biotech (and being puzzled at the 'human dignity' arguments), I am still willing to hear good arguments to counter my own. I thought this would be the book. It was not. The first section of the book is a rehash of the developments and techinical information needed to make a meaningful discussion of biotech. Here, Fukuyama gains both his stars. He was clear, concise, and he even managed to say in one sentence what I've seen others say in 2 paragraphs, and more comprehensively. Being familliar with a lot of this info from past readings, a lesser writer may have caused me to skip over the chapters. Even though I'd read most of the info before, reading it in Fukuyama's words was exciting. Then there is the second, decidedly more philosophical section, where the author discusses first, human rights, and second, human dignity. Here, we see that Fukuyama is truly "Aristotle's bulldog". He first makes a(n almost irrelevent) case for natural rights. How does he do it? Surprise, suprise: humans have natures; those natures are (with minor variance) universal: therefore, human rights exist. He tells us that "ought" actually can be derived from "is". But here is the problem. Fukuyama is very selective in what he recognizes as human nature. Many prominent biologists have shown that brutish things like revenge, rape, infanticide, and bluffing (via game theory) are also part of our universal natures. Should we recognize them as rights too? Fukuyama, oddly, is silent. (somme other reviewers have made astute critiques of his "natural rights" proofs). While I think that 'oughts' should be made with 'is's' in mind (judgments should be INFORMED by fact), Fukuyama (and other natural rights theorists) must unavoidably be selective in what parts of our natures to count as 'natural rights' and which not to. These are value judgments and ones based almost unavoidably on PRIOR conceptions of what is desirable. Therefore, "is" to "ought" is not a necessary step, but a highly 'unnatural' moral leap. (Oddly enough, Fukuyama quotes Hume saying exactly this, never quite rebutting him. Hume, it turns out, makes the stronger case!) From there, we talk about human dignity. I certainly agree with Fukuyama on two points: first, science has had a nasty tendency to (somewhat sadistically) make statements "degrading human dignity". Instead of being the third chimpanzee (an oversimplification to say the least), we are "JUST (read: only or merely) the third chimpanzee. Similarly Richard Dawkins likes to say that we are survival machines BLINDLY programmed by our genes to ensure their, not our, survival. The second area that I agree with Fukuyama is that science has made it appear that since we are made of the same stuff as other animals, that we are really not much different from them. This ignores obvious empirical evidence that even if we have the same emotions as, say, bonobos, we not only have more of them, but we can do such things as supress them, learn about them, modify them (fairly quickly) and be aware of them in a second-order way. Fukuyama, then, is right on these two counts and becuase of both of them, science has appeared to threaten our human dignity. Where he is not correct is on the conclusions he draws from is: that biotech DOES threaten our dignity. If our natures can be manipulated, he says, then there is really not much special about us at all. My answer: only if that is the way YOU want to think of it, but your conclusion doesn't necessarily follow. After all, we can control diamonds: we can cut them, color them, crush them into powder, chisel them to our specs; but does that make a diamond less valuable to us? No. So if I were to engineer my daughter prior to birth to try and ensure that she is as healthy or has the 'best brain' possible, does that diminish her future high score on the SAT's? I highly doubt she will really think of it as my, and not her own, achievement. Fukuyama also assumes that we will be able to genetically engineer to ensure our children are succesful in life. Hmmm....I thought environmental factors played pretty important roles in ones 'succcess' (whether you've the right business partners, whether consumers like your ideas, whether you are in the right place at the right time with the right people...etc.) There is a third section that takes his 'arguments' and applies them to public policy debates where his ultimate stance is to put serious regulations on cloning and biotech. I found this section only skim-worthy, as they rely on the faulty argumenets in previous sections. I generally don't write long reviews, but there are honestly so many fallacies, over-simplifications, and unrealistic speculations in this book (not much of a departure from The End of History)that writing a short one would feel wrong. My suggestion? Read the book, but do so skeptically. A better book explicating the same kind of fears but with better arguments? "Human Cloning and Human Dignity" by The President's Council on Bioethics.