[.ca] The Iraq War: A Military History (ISBN 0674019687)

Shopworn:
If you want to get some background on why we went to Iraq, you'll find only shopworn justification of WMD which has since proven to be wrong. Not well written and weak on a balanced historical perspective and geopolitics. These authors tried to get out first-with-the-least critical analysis. Be patient and check readers' reviews for another book.

Lessons To Be Learned:
This novel is a solid and very informative overview of the war with Iraq, including a review of the earlier Desert Storm campaign and some reflections on the 12 years of containment and attrition the U.S. and the United Kingdom engaged in against Saddam Hussein. Murray, one of the best military historians of our generation, and Scales, a retired Army major general and one of the leading intellectuals on the art of war and technological change, combine to give this book an enormous chronicle of warfare contemplation. A wide range of personal relationships also allowed the authors to interview many of the key participants immediately following the battles. The Iraq War captures the audacity and daring of General Franks' campaign plan and the persistent boldness with which it was executed. Also emphasized is the fact that the component commanders truly understood Franks' intent and, when in doubt, took risks and kept pushing the envelope for more speed and more surprise. There are no gigantic revelations in the authors' account of Operation Iraqi Freedom and their assessment of what worked and what didn't; however, they highlight some principles that every sophisticated American should reflect upon when thinking about our future national security policies. Several of these principles are covered in the remainder of this review. Murray and Scales signify the human element in war and the stunning mismatch in technology, training, experience, and professionalism between the coalition and the Iraqis. But once the fighting shifted into the existing guerilla phase, most of those advantages lost much of their force. An implicit contrast is drawn between the Marine Corps system of every member being a rifleman and every convoy being expected to protect itself and the very different Army model of inadequately trained non-combat soldiers being protected by combat forces. It is clear from their outline of events that the Marine Corps progress through the inhabited areas was actually much more challengeable than the third division's drive through the desert. This is not to minimize the extraordinary speed and drive of the Army's flanking maneuver, but it does raise an interesting question about examining more carefully the Marine Corps doctrine for urban warfare (and their practice of policing areas with the support of local people). The authors report favorably on the subtle, intelligence-led British effort to capture Basra with minimum casualties to the Shia and the way in which this effort made policing the city much easier. Americans could gain an education from the British in the art of policing potentially hostile people. The largest intelligence failure of the war was our underestimation of the power of the Baathist secret police and the torture system they employed to force others to continue fighting against us. This mistake was compounded by the fact that we didn't comprehend the bitterness that the Shia people had harbored toward us since 1991. In that year, they rebelled at what they thought was President George H.W. Bush's suggestion and then 50,000 were slaughtered by Saddam's forces, while the U.S. did nothing. In the early stages of the Iraq war, these people were restrained by a palpable fear that we would not persist, and they would not risk helping us until they were confident that our troops were there for the duration. The role of the Syrians and other hostile forces is undeniably clear. One example cited is "the enemy was far more skilled ... Hornbuckle was later to learn that most of the attacking fedayeen were not Iraqis but Syrian jihadists who had made the trip to Baghdad specifically to kill Americans; out of the thirty POWs captured on Curly, twenty-eight were Syrians." (p. 215) This and other references raise not only the question of why the Syrian dictatorship was allowing them to enter Iraq but also speculate where these enemies were being trained, since it their training was clearly superior to that of their Iraqi counterparts. A succinct description of the second campaign requirements to rebuild a new system of safety, health, prosperity, and freedom are worth being read by every American: "Success in this new war will not be gauged by how many Republican Guard tanks are destroyed but by the less tangible and quantifiable measurement of people's acceptance of a new Iraqi leadership. Attitudes will be influenced less by demonstrations of fighting strength than by the emotional security that comes from safe streets, employment, electricity and fresh water. ... wars are conducted by human beings for political ends." (p. 237) Every informed American should read this book to place their embedded memories of specific events into the larger context of the two campaigns of the war. The first campaign we won brilliantly. The second, we are now engaged in. We should make sure that we learn from these campaigns and apply our learned knowledge to the next time.

Important Political Year Reading:
. Summary: Great reading that is hard to put down. The writers are insightful, with expert, well researched and provide compelling information gleaned from expert well connected sources whom they had long term friendships and associations with. The book appears factually written without an apparent political agenda. An increasingly important factor for books coming out this year. Truly substantial information, facts, and details of the war. Substantially more than will be commented on here. Many disparate situations are better understood and explained by this book - like how can a mechanical support team get lost in the middle of combat? Political Year Issues: General Franks re-wrote modern military tactics with his blitzkrieg through Iraq to topple one of the most brutal dictatorships with the (one time) 5th best army in the world. Could the war have been won with much greater costs and loss of life on both sides? Good thought provoking information including substantial captured Syrian jihad troops in the fedayeen forces - what were they doing there? What does this mean to us in looking forward to the next middle eastern crisis? Questions Remaining: If we found no weapons of mass destruction, but we knew they were there before (they were previously used and the US, England, France and Russia sold them to Saddam Hussein and all agreed they were there at one time). Where did they go? Do the presence of Syrian jihad troops give us a strong enough linkage to pursue Syria for the missing WMD's? (This is my personal belief, for what little it is worth.) The point being there is no evidence of the WMD's being destroyed, therefore they must be someplace. Buried in the desert? Or, in a neighboring country? What is Syria's role in this war (with its superiorly trained troops), and potential aftermath issues that will have to be addressed within this decade? Syria remains a dictatorship that harbors and trains terrorists in its Bacca Valley and still plans to drive every Israeli Jew into the Mediterranean Sea - regardless of any peace treaty. Negatives: Could use more dialogue to bring out the first hand experience, rather than being a citation. Could have used more maps and diagrams. These are really essential for digesting troop movements relative to cities, and relative locations in a fairly dispersed and desolate land.

Extremely balanced source:
I found this book much better written and covering a wider scope of the Operation Iraqi Freedom than the completely dry book of Anthony Cordesman on the same subject, which didn't have a single map! Murray and Scales have done an excellent work with this book and one can find many interesting details on the operational aspects of the campaign in Iraq, especially the fine maneuver of the 1st Marine Division to deceive the Iragis at Kut and pass the Tigris river in another location outflanking Baghdad from the east.

Decent Overview:
The Iraq War is a decent overview of the recent war in Iraq. It's strongest points are made in the early chapters where the authors attempt to put the war in context. "Origins of War" and "The Opposing Sides" are the best summaries I've seen on the build up and causes of the war -- from Saddam's duplicity to the UNs fecklessness, Murray and Scales provide an outstanding background as to why war occurred. The summary on the ground war was adequate, while the chapter on the air war was relatively weak and uninspired. The most disappointing aspect of the book was its lack of insightful post-war analysis and impact of the war on our future military capabilities. But, all in all, the book is a good read and well worth the cost for the outstanding pre-war analysis.