[.ca] Truman and the Hiroshima Cult (ISBN 0870134035)

essential a-bomb history:
Wow. Newman sets out to (and overwhelmingly succeeds) to obliterate any and all arguments of those who claim the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki unjustified and/or not needed. He does this by exploring not only the myths perpetuated by these "cultists" (the word he uses to describe people who endorse the above), but also how and why these myths began. These people believe the bombing was primarily motivated by something other than military reasons and fall into one of six categories, namely those who think primary motivation was: (1)intimidation of the Soviet Union (2)racism (3)desire of scientists to experiment with a new toy (4)fear of investigation by Congress of those in charge of the A-bomb project if the expenditure found not useful (5)sheer bureaucratic momentum (6)any combination of the above. The book is essentially a debate; an appeal to actual history vs. convolution and misrepresentation of facts by some very formidable-sounding opponents. Some include U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (the impetus behind most of those who endorse any of the above), Gar Alporovitz, P.M.S. Blackett among most any others of note. The sheer volume of impeccable research would suffice for a great argument, but the way Newman delves into the sources behind the sources and their context coupled with the flawless logic he employs is simply stunning - its a virtual lesson in debate as well as vital history. Knowing from outset his intention (to argue) I consciously tried to poke holes in his discussion and failed miserably (since I was familiar with Gar Alporovitz's opus 'The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb'as well as a fair amount of WWII history, I thought I was reasonably prepared - wrong!) Even though Newman's discussion is rational, logical, and non-vindictive or inflammatory, he effectively skewers his opponents. However, he still remains balanced in his position as his discussion of the AEC and post-war events shows. Highlights include his discussion of post-war events that influenced the American 'cultists' genesis and perpetuation as well as a total of deaths attributable to the Japanese from 1931-45. I truly wish that I could point to a major flaw but I simply cannot. The book is not archival but isn't intended to be (try Rhodes 'The Making of the Atomic Bomb'). Newman's position in a nutshell: the decision to use the bomb was motivated primarily by ending the war as quickly as possible while saving as many lives as possible. If somebody wants to argue with him, good luck. Outstanding book.

Thank You Robert P. Newman:
What a debt of gratitude we owe to this author for so powerfully slamming the arguments of the so-called revisionists, who hold that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had no military value whatsoever and only served to show the Soviets how powerful we were, an argument so laughable as to require a refutation as strong as our counterattack on the Japs themselves after Pearl Harbor. Point by point, the assertions made by the revisionists are destroyed. The battle of Okinawa, which took place only a few weeks before the bombings, with it's massive U.S. casualties, kamikaze attacks and widespread suicides by civilians is discussed. This is an episode either ignored or downplayed in most revisionist writings, and obviously constitutes a gaping hole in their arguments. The peace feelers sent out by the Japanese, which are usually inflated and put on the same level as a waving white flag, are shown to be half-hearted attempts by largely impotent civilian leaders to negotiate favorable terms that were thoroughly opposed by the military who fully controlled the country. Japanese plans to repel the planned U.S.invasion are documented in detail, and will give pause to those who believe the Japanese were incapable of waging war effectively by this time. Many other revisionist claims are shown to be weak at best and downright humorous at worst. Some information given here is not so well known. For example, the widespread war weariness among allied troops was starting to show signs of developing into mutiny, thereby giving Truman another incentive to end the war fast. This was new to me. First hand accounts of Japanese leaders about their view of the Potsdam Declaration show that it was hardly seen as a death sentence for their emperor. Perhaps the most fascinating chapter deals with the doctrine of unconditional surrender and the reasons why this policy was in force. The Monday morning quarterbacks who second guess Truman's decision see this policy as nothing but an impediment to peace and have zero understanding of it's value. Another widely cited piece of evidence is a report by the U.S. military that the Japanese would have surrendered without the bomb. This report is completely discredited by Newman, who actually finds evidence of the opposite conclusion within the research done by this "survey". All in all this book is an excellent refutation of a well publicized ideological campaign that masquerades as history. The only thing missing is that in the explanation of why this school of thought arose, not much is said about the shock the world felt at the use of atomic weapons. It's easy to understand why many would have second thoughts about such a horrible tool of destruction and why no sane person would ever want to see it used again. I think this is at least one motivation behind the attempts to show how it's use could have been avoided. But a distortion is still a distortion, and Newman does a decisive job of blasting this one out of the water.