[.ca] American and British Aircraft Carrier Development, 1919-1941 (ISBN 1557503826)

a well-done history:
Britain started out ahead, but partly for that reason her carrier forces (and especially planes) were less suited for combat than America's. This is an excellent study of how that came to pass. Sadly missing is an equally insightful look at the Japanese carrier fleet, which in the winter of 1941-42 was arguably the equal of America's.

Just what the title promises :):
An intelligent and thoughtful study of how it happened that the United States started late, yet managed to enter World War II with a better carrier force than the Royal Navy. (In part, this was because the US *did* start late, and therefore didn't have an installed base of obsolete equipment.) The only problem with this book is that it doesn't give equal time to the Japanese carrier fleet, which as it happened was America's only real competitor in this developing science.

Good insights, poor organization:
There are many good insights and much worthwhile information here. But there is no apparent organization of ideas, either among the chapters, within a chapter, within a page or sometimes within a paragraph. Ideas and facts are presented, and repeated later, as if this were several slightly different articles on the same subject laid end-to-end. We are told about the movie "Helldivers" at least twice, for instance, and both times it is introduced as if new; and many times it is repeated that the Royal Navy did not have an institutional way of resolving technical aviation issues, while the USN had an interaction among BuAer, the War College and Fleet exercises. This repetition (in a book of only 200 pages) masks the fact that there is not really a book's worth of information here, and that and the poor organization mean that many important questions just aren't brought up (like, just how were the personnel policies for Naval Aviators decided? What actually were the options considered at various points in time?). It also masks some flaws in logic: the authors are fond of saying that the interwar navies were like cash-strapped gamblers in a casino, who could not afford to lose, and so spread their bets evenly. Apart from the implicit assumption that a rich man can afford to lose everything, this is an excellent way to military disaster, making onself weak everywhere; and it is not explained how refusing to make a choice among options is actually making a choice. Neither is the book particularly well-written; in too many places I had to go over again a sentence or paragraph, trying to figure out just what the authors were trying to say. "Related to the concept of cost is that of risk"--immediately after two paragraphs apparently discussing risk. This book might be useful to find some facts and ideas not otherwise immediately available; or, I would hope, as an inspiration for a more thorough and organized study.--CDR, USNR, ret.