[.ca] Patton At Bay: The Lorraine Campaign, 1944 (ISBN 1574887823)

An Academic critique of an American icon:
This is one of the only books I've ever read that critique General Patton. This book, to me the layman seems extremely well researched, and worthy of academic exaltations. The author is brave to look at the Lorraine Campaign with such a critical eye, not always welcome on American icons of war.

Academic, but no sense of Military Leadership:
I found the book to be an exercise in academic deconstructionism. For example, the author assumed a lack of strategic flexibility on the part of Patton to deal with the static battle line. An interesting assumption but confusing tactics with strategy, especially grand strategy, is always a problematic tendency of academics. A career military professional will see through the rather weak argument and see the authors attempt to lable the Lorraine campaign as a "defeat". The author predicates his argument of the assumption that the Ruhr was more important than it turned out to be, that Patton was wrong concerning his belief that, if supplies had not been redirected, he could have pressed the Rhine and misses the opportunity to see the creative flexibility of the 3rd Army as it relieved Bastogne, a feat which no other allied commander believed could be done in less than 30 days. When viewed against the exploits of the 1st, 9th, and 5th Armies, it seems that the author is simply looking to write a book that will cause a stir about an American icon. Patton was rude, crude and certainly a primodona. He was wisely never choosen as a group commander, in my opinion. However,Patton, unlike Napolean, never lost and that is sometimes hard for "fair" minded American academics to take in light of his anti-academic approach to killing the enemy. Unlike Eisenhower and Bradely, who were overjoyed at the taking of territory, Patton, in his and his subordinates writtings, knew that to win wars you must engage and destroy the enemy not hold territory.