"And I Was There": Pearl Harbor And Midway -- Breaking ... (ISBN 1591144507)

Navy coverup for their Pearl Harbor incompetence:
And I was there. This is a great book by one who was there, Adm Layton. He was Adm Kimmels intelligence officer at Pearl Harbor. He shows how the incompetence of the Navy in Washington led to the surprise attack at Pearl, by the Navy, specifically adm Stark and Kelly Turner, not giving Pearl the vital information they had about Jap intentions, but refused to give Pearl. The Navy also had 2 intelligence groups fighting for the information, and control, evaluating, and dissemination of the information. This too sabotaged the intelligence efforts, and does to this day. Gen Marshall is also responsible for the debacle. He was reprimanded, but Roosevelt set aside the Congressional verdict on him. Kimmel was judged not guilty of any wrongdoing by the Navy, but found derelict by Congress, a tragic miscarriage of justice, due to lies under testimony by Stark, and Turner. The Redmon brothers are faulted too for ousting the most brilliant Navy intelligence officer, Rochefort, who correctly guessed the time and location of the Midway battle. Another tragic aftermath of Pearl, was the loss of Wake Island. Kimmel had a carrier task force sailing to resupply and relieve the garrision that was under attack by the Japs. This would have surprised the Japs and could have sunk many Jap ships, saved Wake Island, and kept open the supply lines to the Phillipines. Unfortunaely, Kimmel was relieved, and Adm Pye replaced him Pye lost his nerve and cancelled the mission. MacArthur is noted, as being in charge of the Phillipines, and being under orders to attack Formosa with his B17's when Pearl was attacked. He had a 9 hour warning after Pearl had been attacked, and had been told to attack. It was not until years after this book was published that the records of why Mac did nothing in the Phillipines were found. He was paid $650,000 by Pres Quezon of the Phillipines to do nothing, as he wanted to be neutral. MacArthur lost the Phillipines, a far more important strategic outpost than Pearl, as well as half the B17's we had, and 1/5 of our fighters, on the ground, just as what happened at Pearl, only 9 hours later, after he had multiple phone calls from Washington to attack the Japs. The battle of Guadalcanal and other Pacific battles is also gone into in some detail It was Nimitz, not Mac Arthur that devised the island hopping idea. A great book by a hero who was there.

A Codebreaker's Analysis of Pearl Harbor and Midway:
Edwin T. Layton served as Fleet Intelligence Officer for Admirals Kimmel and Nimitz. He, along with the other members of station Hypo, were assigned the task of breaking into Japan's secret codes, especially their JN-25 cypher. Through exhausting efforts by its members, they were finaly able to penetrate enough of the JN-25 code to make reasonable assumptions as to what the Japanese navy was planning. "Magic" was the term used for the intercept and decryption of these secret codes. However, no decoding was actually done at Pearl Harbor, because there was no "Purple" decoding machine there. All intercepts had to be sent to Washinton for decryption, and Hawaii relied on Washington for their information. Layton's thesis is that Pearl Harbor was denied vital intelligence which, if issued in a timely fashion, could have alerted Pearl Harbor to the impending attack which occurred on December 7, 1941. Although I agree with some of his thesis, I also believe that the Pearl Harbor commanders made terrible mistakes of their own which also contributed to the unpreparedness of Pearl Harbor. One message that Washington failed to send Pearl Harbor which I believe, along with Layton, could have alerted the fleet to the attack was the so-called "bomb plot" message. In a nutshell, this message divided Pearl Harbor into several sections and placed ships in each section; almost like laying an invisible grid over the harbor. Of all the messages that Pearl Harbor failed to receive, this was probably the most important. However, with this stated, I also believe that the commanders made grievous errors of their own. On November 27, 1941, a "war warning" message was sent to both commanders at Pearl Harbor. Both seemed perplexed and unsure of the course of action to be taken. Why was this? Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short were high ranking members of the military, yet they both dragged their feet when they received this message. Short simply ordered defense against sabotage instead of ordering an all-out alert, while Kimmel failed to order any further long-range patrols, plus he didn't order the battle force to sea. They seemed incapable of making any independent judgement of their own. Instead, they needed to be told directly what to do. These omissions are unforgivable. Inter-service rivalry also played a role in the failure. As pointed out by Layton, there was very little inter-service cooperation or sharing of messages, so most of the time, one usually didn't know what the other was doing. Further, during the Midway operation, a rivalry betwen station Hypo and the Washington-based intelligence unit nearly cost us the battle, but fortunately, Layton and commander Joe Rochefort were able to convince Nimitz that Hypo, not Washington, was correct. I thought this was a good book, but I disagree with Layton's assertion that Kimmel and Short were scapegoats and had no clue what was happening. Granted, there was some intelligence that was definitely denied to them, but they should have been able to interpret events on ther own, namely the war warning message. This book is a good counter-argument to other works, such as "At Dawn We Slept". The information about the battle of Midway is especially interesting, plus the story of the codebreaking activities was well-done.

A real eye opener!:
Before you jump on some revisionist books about Pearl Harbor, like Stinnet's Day of Deceipt, you should get it from the horses mouth! Layton, et al, tell a little known side of the war in the pacific. His opinions of some famous naval personalities like Stark and R.K. Turner will really have you thinking about how war is run when powerful, ambitious officers are running the show. It's a shame that lives had to be wasted while the U.S. got its act together to finally win the war in the pacific, but Layton's tale will give you a new perspective and supports much of what was previously written, like Prang's "At Dawn We Slept", about the debacle of Pearl Harbor and the genius that followed at Midway. Buy it!

A 'Must Read' for Anyone Interested In Pearl/Midway:
As the Fleet Intellegence Officer of Admirals Kimmel and Nimitz Edwin Layton was in a unique position to see and to understand what was going on regarding the battles at Pearl Harbor and Midway. This welcome reprint to the 1985 book has to be considered one of the more definitive books of the couple of hundred on the subjects. Layton was a language officer stationed in Japan before the war to learn Japanese. He followed Japan and the Japanese developments closely. He was at Pearl before the attack and remained there throughout the war. He was on the Missouri at the Japanese surrender. There are a series of revisionist history books that propose such things as Roosevelt and Churchill conspiring to let the Japanese attack at Pears. Yes there is evidence that we had some intelligence pointing to the Japanese attack. But you have to look carefully at how much material there was, how many messages had been intercepted, how few had been translated and you come up with the basic understanding that it just hadn't been put together. A lot like the situation with 9/11, Monday morning quarterbacking is much easier than being in the midst of the game. Layton was there, he knew what Kimmel and Short knew, indeed he had briefed them with the material on hand. Could they have been better prepared, yes, Layton says, if Admiral Richmond K. Turner had forwarded the information. But like any inter-departmental power struggle, Turner held the information to himself. I was also surprised by the relatively little animosity shown towards the Redman brothers who bounced Rochefort and Safford out. Indeed Layton points out that the do it themselves style of Rochefort and Safford probably wouldn't have done a very good job of managing the Navy Radio Intelligence activities that grew to almost 8,500 people by the end of the war. All in all, a must read for anyone interested in what happened at Pearl and Midway.

Valuable Insights ...:
Layton's "And I Was There" text (published initially in 1985, and after his death completed by Pineau and Costello) makes many significant and important contributions to the historiography of Pearl Harbor and its many remaining ghosts. This book should be read very carefully and with an expectation that much marginalia ends (or perhaps begins) the effort. It has a number of rich veins to mine, with several assessors (than and now) giving it high praise. It is also suggested that this text be juxtaposed with Prange's "At Dawn We Slept" (aka 'ADWS" which was also completed after Prange's death by two of his associates, Goldstein and Dillon). Gaps, errors, inconsistencies, and levels of bias are evident where pre-supposed and vaguely established Pearl Harbor orthodoxy is truly challenged. That Layton was in fact an eye-witness to these events is important here, and for anyone delving into the still murky waters of Pearl Harbor, this book is certainly a "must read." Absolute veracity should not be accepted carte blanc, however as a caution to the reader. To note, Pineau (USN retired) was Morison's Japanese linguist supporting his multi-volume efforts, and Costello, the author of "The Pacific War", is recalled as having asked during the 1995 Thurmond-Spence hearings for US governmental assistance in having several British materials declassified. Pineau and Costello are now deceased. For a flavor of "And I Was There" some snippets are highlighted: Page 136: "At the 1945 Pearl Harbor hearings it was repeatedly charged that the president had exceeded his constitutional powers in making a secret alliance with Britain. But although considerable evidence was cited, the full records of the Joint Board meetings were not made available to the hearings. As a result the majority determined that no such commitment had been made. This refusal to release the records was an understandable effort to protect Roosevelt against charges that he had acted unconstitutionally. But the most damaging aspect of the original conferences was the failure of Admiral Stark to immediately inform the Pacifc Fleet commander of the true implications of the new Anglo-American strategy against Japan. The failure to pass on such a critical bit of information was inexcusable." (In 1937, then Captain Ingersoll, was ordered to London by FDR to begin the Anglo-American discussions.) Page 165: "Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, who at the time was chief of the Far East section of G-2, testified that he believed these two messages indicated the Japanese were showing 'an unusual interst in the port of Honolulu.' He said he had 'discussed this with my opposition numbers in the navy on several occasions.' They concluded that the subdivision of Pearl Harbor into areas might be 'a device to reduce the volume of radio traffic ... a plan for sabotage ... a plan for a submarine attack ... or it might be a plan for an air attack. (emphasis added.)' Why had this vital evaluation of intelligence in Washington not been sent to us at Pacific Fleet headquarters? With the advantage of hindsight this is what both Admiral Kimmel and the 1945 congresional investigators wanted answered. It never was." (Numerous other instances of suppressing warnings intended for Pearl Harbor are well-documented.) Page 202: "On November 26 there was received specifc evidence of the Japanese intention to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United States (emphasis added), was how it was described in 1944 by the army board set up to investigate Pearl Harbor. ... Kimmel asked his former chief, 'Do you recall whether on or about 26 November you received information from the office of naval intelligence that gave specific evidence of Japan's intention to wage offensive war against Britain and France?' Although the tribunal was sitting in secret, Stark insisted that to answer this question would 'involve the disclosure of information deterimental to the public interest.' The court came to his rescue by ruling that he need not reveal any 'state secrets.'" (Even now in December 2008, sixty-seven years after Pearl Harbor, this question - What specific evidence? - has not been answered.) Page 205: " ... HMAS Sydney" ... (Her resting place has recently been discovered.) Page 213: "Three large submarines, each with a floatplane in a waterproof hanger, scouted two hundred miles ahead of the striking force, ..." (Compare this to Prange's comments on fog and visibility with these I-boats.) Page 249: "... heavy seas ruled out any refueling throughout the day. " and Page 254 " ... 'refueling is impossible and the heavy rolling and pitching of the battleship makes her crew distressed and suffer.'" (For 2Dec41 and 4Dec41, refueling is not possible - so much for those placid seas and high-pressure weather fronts.) Page 268: "Safford recalled how Wilkinson then left to 'get it released by the front office' - meaning Turner, the director of war plans. It was not until two years later that Safford realized while reading the Roberts Commission testimony that McCollum's warning had never been sent. It prompted Safford's search for the missing winds alert and ultimately his crusade to set the record straight by showing how 'Admiral Kimmel was a scapegoat from the start.'" (So much for bureaucratic screw-ups, rather supression with intent.) Page 317: "It was a 'bilateral,' a two-way reading of either 363 degrees or 183 degrees ..." (The so-called "bilateral" problem was solved in 1903 by Marconi engineers using a double-loop antenna, where the angle between the loops was 90 degrees. 'Ham' Wright's testimony before the Hewitt Inquiry (Part 26, Proceedings of the Hewitt Inquiry, Exhibit 144, page 380) states that 'unilateral' readings were made. Finally, note the Layton error - there is no such bearing as 363 degree.) Page 317: "'How do you know it's Akagi?' I asked. Joe explained, 'It's the same ham-fisted radio operator who uses his transmitting key as if he is kicking it with his foot'" (See additional "fist" comments, for example, on page 174 and pages 229-230. As the story about "radio deception" has as a major pillar that the Japanese naval operators from the Striking Force remaining in Home Waters; at least one remained on Akagi.. Also see page 547, note 19, for a bit more from a chapter of CSP-1494-A "Did the Japanese Paint Us a Picture". OP-20-G discrediting campaign against Rochefort and his men?) Page 342: "Wilkinson recounted how he had been accompained by Captain McCollum to the munitions building where he found General Miles and Colonel Bratton already present in the boardroom. His digest of the evidence of the morning of 19 December suggest that there was a certain degree of collusion and deliberate misstatement in what appears to have been a collaborative effort by army and navy to convery the impression that no intelligence had been withheld from Admiral Kimmel or General Short." (What happened to Wilkinson?) Page 495 to the book's end: To be read with some care, perhaps even read a number of times. The authors' comments (e.g., Page 503 about Prange's methodology), lessons, hearings' descriptions to date of publications, materials known, chapter references, ..., etc., are all worth the time spent.